The Emergency and realism

My friend Dr Cian O'Driscoll of Glasgow University has gently chided me for using realism as a foil in my post on the Irish deserters. He suggests that there is considerable more to realism and neo-realism than my comments take account of.
I plead guilty to this charge. Cian is correct: there is much in realism as a method of understanding the world that is missed in my remarks. In particular its emphasis on the anarchic nature of the world system and the absence of a global authority are hindsights that require respect and attention. I have some criticisms of realism as generally applied but this is not the place to go into that discussion.
In respect of the discussion of Ireland the reason I used realism is not that it cannot offer insights into the behaviour and policy choices of Irish leaders during the Emergency; it certainly can do so.  Mine was a more limited critique of historians who utilise a rather banal and unsophisticated version of realism to justify Irish behaviour at all times during this complex period of history. In particular realism is invoked to exclude any moral dimension to the discussion on Ireland's role (or lack of it) during the Second World War. One argument that has been used to defend Irish neutrality is to focus on the various times that Irish actions favoured the allies. One way of looking at this is to explain it in terms of Ireland doing as much as it has to to prevent either the Allies or the Axis from invading. So Irish concessions to Britain and the US were a consequence of Ireland's proximity to Britain and a necessary act to protect the state and its citizens. Some writers have cited these examples to suggest that Ireland was in fact pro-Allied, though such an interpretation cannot be justified on realist grounds or indeed on the evidence. One book on the topic has the title 'Ireland in World War Two' which to say the least is misleading as only one part of Ireland was in the war and that was Northern Ireland.
I would suggest a multi-dimensional approach to this question. There are impelling realist aspects to Irish policy making during the war: the defence of a weak state under pressure from a neighbour which has security concerns with its neutrality, the wish to safeguard its sovereignty and the reluctance to become involved in what was considered to be someone else's fight. Alongside this there was an ideological dimension which ranged from pro-British to Pro-Nazi, though indifference was often the most widely held belief. However, in government and among the political and social elite there were nuanced responses to the conflict, but these often followed partisan identities: Fianna Fail members were sometimes pro-German or at least anti-British while Fine Gael was pro-British - in the main all were pro-neutrality but with different emphasis. Fine Gael might have been more likely to agree some form of alliance with Britain or the US but Fianna Fail were never going to do this. There are other dimensions that require further research, including those who volunteered for the British forces, the nature of those who deserted and went to Britain and indeed the nature of mass opinion within Ireland itself. An issue that requires close attention is whether Ireland was isolationsit during and after the Emergency period. I believe a strong case can be made for this postion but not everyone would agree with this.
I have reworked the setting for this blog and if you wish to post a reply to me you should be able to do so now. I hope you do and look forward to comments.